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The Value to Consumers of Genetically Modified Food Labels
in a Market Avith Diverse Information:
Evidence from Experimental Auctions
Wallace E. Huffman, Jason F. Shogren, Matthew Rousu, and Abe Tegene
Abstract
When a food item might be genetically modified (GM) and divergent information about risks
and benefits exists, do U.S. consumers value information provided by a label? This paper
addresses this question by designing and conducting an experimental auction to elicit consumers'
willingness to pay for both GM-labeled and standard-labeled foods. The evidence gathered for
vegetable oil, tortilla chips, and potatoes shows that labelsmatter, and in particular, consumers
werewilling to pay abouta 14percentpremium for food items theyperceived as non-GM. We
found that women and men have similar reactions to the GM-food labels, but the sequencing of
food labels, i.e., seeingGM-labels first or second, was statistically significant. If consumers bid
onfoods with GM-food labels in the first of two rounds ofbidding, they onaverage reduced
their bids.
Key words: genetic modification, food labels, GM-foods, laboratory auctions, experimental
economics, comchips, vegetable oil,potatoes, willingness to pay, demand consumers
The growing genetically modified (GM) food controversy and consumers* attempts to
make better food purchasing decisions have pressed GM-food labeling into an important public
policy issue around the globe. In the United States, while truthful labeling has been used to
provide consumers with information on calories, nutrients, and food ingredients, the federal
government only requires explicit GM-labels if a GM-food has distinctive characteristics relative
to the non-GM version. In contrast, the European Commission adopted genetically modified
organism (GMO) food labeling in 1997. The Commission requires each member country to
enact a law requiring labeling of all new products containing genetically modified organisms. In
some European Union (EU) countries, information technologies have made it economically
feasible to encrypt large amounts of informationon food package bar codes. Japan, Australia,
and manyother countries have also passed laws requiring GM-labels for major foods. Labeling
involves real costs—fixed costs of designing labels and testing —and variable costs ofmonitoring
for truthfulness. Acritical open question iswhether the social benefits from labeling are likely
to exceed the cost?
This paper presents empirical evidence on U.S. consumers* willingness to pay for foods
with and without GM-labels using laboratory auction experiments for three food items. In an
experimental auction with divergent information about risks and benefits, we examine whether
consumers value information provided in GM-labels. Following Fox et al. (2001), we create the
divergent information design by providing six combinations ofpro-GM, anti-GM, and third
party perspectives, which provide their corresponding views on the scientific impact, human
_ impact, financial impact, and environmental impact of GM-foods. The participants are actual
^ consumers randomly chosen in two major Midwestern U.S. cities by the Iowa State University
(ISU) Statistics Department. They were paid to participate in experiments on food and household
2products. Herein we report tests of the following hypotheses; Holding consumer tastes constant,
(HI) GM-labels have no effect on consumers' willingness to pay for food items, (H2) no
difference exists in consumers' willingness to pay for food items due to the GM-food-label
treatment sequence, i.e., whether consumers first bid on foods with or without GM-food labels,
and (H3) the effects of GM-food labels on willingness to pay for food items are the same for
male and female consumers.
Background on Costs and Benefits of GM-Labels
The U.S. issued regulations in 1992 (Department ofHealth and Human Services) stated
that GM-food did not have to be labeled if the food product had the same characteristics as their
non-GM counterparts. In January 2001, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued a
"Guidancefor Industry" statement for labelingGMproducts. The FDA agreed that the only
GM-foods needing to be labeled are foods having different characteristics from the non-GM
version. For firms that choose to label their GM-foods, the FDA has recommended guidelines
that should be followed. Forexample, the FDA prefers that GM foods are notlabeled as
genetically modified." Consumer surveys by the FDA found that this label misleads consumers
into thinking the product has different characteristics. Rather the FDA prefers that foods be
labeled as "genetically engineered" or"made using genetic modification" instead. Canada has a
similar policy as the United States. Canada requires labeling only ifthere are health or safety
issues.
The European Union has ade facto moratorium on the approval ofany new GM-foods
which has been in place since April 1998. The EU first implemented amandatory labeling
policy on GM-foods in 1997 and modified the standard in January 2000. If any ingredient in the
3food is at least one percent GM, the food must be labeled "genetically modified." In February
2001, the European Parliament voted for stricter regulations. The new regulations require
stricter labeling and monitoring of GM products, and establishing methods for tracing GM
products through the food chain (CNN). These new regulations, however, do not eliminate the
moratorium.
Australia and New Zealand implemented standards that took effect in December 2001
(Australia-New Zealand Food Authority, October 2000). The new standards require "labeling of
food and food ingredients where novel DNA and/or novel protein is present in the final food."
Labeling is not required if no ingredient in a food product is more than one percent genetically
modified. Also, labeling is not required for highly refined foods, foods that used GM processing
aids that are not presentin the final food, or food served in restaurants. If it is an ingredient in a
product that is genetically engineered, the ingredient that is modified must be labeled as
"genetically modified" in the list ofingredients. For a single ingredient GM-food, the phrase
"genetically modified" must belisted onthe front of the packet, next to thename.
InJapan, no labeling was required for GM products before April 2001, but on April 1,
2001, a new policy was implemented. This policy requires labeling ofproducts that have at least
five percent GM content. Ifthe GM content is less five percent, firms have the option to label
products voluntarily. For products that are labeled, producers must label the product as
"genetically modified," "inseparable," or "no GMOs present" (Bemauer, 2001).
Until early 2001, China supported biotechnology. But now China's policy towards GM-
foods has become more reserved. First, China banned GM rice, wheat, maize, tomato, cotton,
and soybeans {AgBiotech Reporter, May 2001). On May 23, 2001, China issued anew, 56
article listing regulation policy on biotechnology. This article aimed at strengthening control
4over all aspects of agricultural biotechnology. A report by the U.S. Foreign Agricultural Service
stated that "the regulation is vaguely worded, leaving a great deal to the discretion of the
department responsible for drafting and enforcing the implementing regulations." The report
goes on to say that there will be safety certification for all GM-food, and all GM-foods will have
to be labeled {AgBiotech Reporter, July 2001).
Caswell (1998,2000) has shown that many policies are possible, including mandatory
labeling of GM-foods, voluntary labeling of GM-foods, or bans on all labeling to indicate
whether a food is genetically modified. The policies, that each country chooses are likely to be
determined by the information demanded by the consumers of each country. An informed
decisionon whether to implementa labelingpolicyon genetically modified foods shouldonly be
done after a benefit/cost analysis.
BeneHts of GM-Labels
Greenpeace and Friends-of-the-Earth both advocate labels onGM-foods to give
consumers the right to choose whether to consume GM-foods. Manyenvironmental and
consumer advocacy groups call formandatory labeling, which they believe benefits consumers.
TheUnited StatesDepartment of Agriculture (USDA), Economic Research Service
(2000), has analyzed the potential benefits of food labels. One benefit is making iteasy for
consumers to find information, e.g., nutritional content offoods. Thus, food labeling can lead to
more informed choices on food and health by consumers. Also, some firms may want to avoid
the prospect of a label giving incorrect signals to consumers and others.
Caswell and Padberg (1992) reconimended a comprehensive view of the benefits of
labels on food products. They suggest these benefits are larger than normally discussed.
5Potential benefits from food labels include increased consumer information, improved,product
design, and more consumer confidence in product quality. Also, labels provide an option value,
even for consumers who do currently read food labels. This option value exists because if a food
is labeled, consumers always have the option to view the label, either now or in the future, and
that option has some value. But these optimistic positive effects did not occur in Switzerland.
When Switzerland implemented GM-food labeling, the GM-foods became the target of anti-
biotech political forces. Consumer demand was dramatically reduced for these food products
and the GM-foods are no longer in the market or an option for consumers.
Costs of GM-Labels
Implementing a labeling policy could be costly. The United States Department of
Agriculture, Economic Research Service (2000) considered the range of costs associated with
implementing a labeling policy. If a mandatory labeling policy on genetically modified foods is
enacted, significant costs would be incurred. Identity preservation, to determine whether a
particular food is GM, has substantial fixed costs. When separating GMfi*om non-GM-fopds,
mistakes indelivery of the product ^e a possibility. In the United States, for instance, a type of
GM com that was banned for human consumption, known as Starlink com, got into the U.S.
food system. Another possible cost isaccidental contamination ofnon-GM crops by their GM
counterpart. Farmers have togotogreat lengths toensure that non-GM crops are not
contaminated with theGM variety. To avoid contaminatiori, farmers need buffer zones, i.e.,
zones between theGM and non-GM crops to lower the probability ofcontamination. Farmers
also must thoroughly clean planting and harvesting equipment between GM and non-GM uses.
All items imply real supply-side costs when a labeling policy is implemented.
6In addition, the added label and storage costs would lead to higher prices for consumers
(and possibly lower prices to producers). The higher prices would affect all consumers, and act
like a regressive tax. Poor people spend a larger sh^e of their income for food than do high-
income households. Also, the poor and less educated are less likely to benefit from food labels.
This leads to what the USDA labeled, a "reverse Robin Hood effect" of taking money from the
poor to benefit the rich.
The USDA suggests that labeling could also change an industry's structure. With some
fixed costs associated with labeling, small firms may have higher per unit labeling costs than
large firms. This creates increasing returns to scale and an incentive for firms to become bigger,
or close down. A labeling policy that decreases the number of fiiros could decrease competition
and could again increase prices for consumers. Another cost firms could face is reformulation
costs, which could be significant.
The USDA also suggests that adding more information to food labels dilutes the other
information given onthelabel. This concern seems most important when the labeling policy
being considered would inform consumers of an attribute thatmay not impact human health,
e.g., genetic modification. Labeling without independent verification is unlikely to be useful.
Hence, a new labeling policy would require resources for government or third-party verification.
That said, there are relatively few estimates ofthe cost for labeling GM-foods. KPMG
was commissioned for a study inAustralia and New Zealand to examine the costs ofcomplying
with'a new labeling law. They estimated that the costs of the labeling laws could mean an
increase in consumer prices from 0.5 to 15 percent, and that firms could also face lower profits
(Phillips and Foster). Even though they commissioned the study, the Australian and New
Zealand Food Standards Council later disregarded KPMG's input, citing flaws in the study.
7Whether this council had legitimate problems with the study, or were taking the politically
expedient path, we do not know. In a study of Canada, Phillips and Smyth (1999) estimated that
a voluntary identity preserved production and marketing system in Canada cost from 13-15 '
percent during 1995-1996. One thing seems apparent; implementing a labeling policy on
genetically modified foods is costly, and involves uncertain effects on, firms, consumers, and the
industry.
Experimental Design
The on-going GM-food debate has been fueled by information provided by the interested
parties. The biotech industry has provided a positive perspective on agricultural biotechnology,
while environmental or anti-technology groups have supplied the negative perspective. Each
perspective is trying to affect the demand for GM-foods and inputs in a particular direction. In
such a contentious environment, an independent, third-party perspective which provides
verifiable information to consumers and farmers might be social welfare improving (Huffman
and Tegene, 2000). Such a verifiable information source, however, would becostly toproduce
and to manage effectively.
With this general background inmind, we designed a research project to incorporate the
private-information-revealing feature ofexperimental auction markets and the rigorous
randomized treatment design ofstatistical experimental design (see for example Hoffman etal.
1993, Fox etal. 1998, Shogren etal. 2000, Lusk etal. 2001).' The primary purpose ofthe
project was to identify the effects ofpositive, negative, and verifiable information about
biotechnology on consumers' willingness to pay for food items that might be genetically
modified. Wedesigned a setof experimental auctions inwhich consumers bid onactual foods
8that differed only by the presence or absence of GM-food labels.
The experimental design consisted of six biotech information-labeling treatments with
two replications. The treatments were randomly assigned to twelve experimental units, each
consisting of 13 to 16consumers drawn from thehouseholds of twomajorurban areas andwho
were paid to participate. We anticipated that a sample size of165 to 190 participants was
necessary for finding statisticallysignificant results, whichwas not prohibitivelycostly. Using
randomly chosen consumers from the population of an urban area, rather than undergraduate
college students at a university, is seen as an advantage when it comes to making inferences,
however cautious, from the experiments to the Midwest or whole U.S. population (also see the
comments in Lusk et al. 2001). Conducting experiments in two urban areas rather than one is
also seen as enhancingcredibilityof our resultsby showing that the experimentscan be
replicated across urban areas.
We nowdescribe the four elements in ourGM labelingexperiments—the GM food, the
auction mechanism, theexperimental units, and the specific steps in theexperiment (which
includes the detailed information labels). Consider each in turn.
The GM Food
We anticipated that consumers might react differently toGM content for foods of
different types. Believing that one food item was unlikely to reveal enough information, we
settled on three items: vegetable oil (made from soybeans), tortilla chips (made from yellow
com), and Russet potatoes. In the distilling and refining process for vegetable oils, essentially
all of the proteins (which are the components ofDNA and source ofgenetic modification) are
removed leaving pure lipids. Minimal human health concerns should arise from consumption of
9the oil, but people might still fear that GM soybeans could harm the natural environment.
Tortilla chips are highly processed foods that may be made from GM or non-GM com, and
consumers might have human health or environmental concerns or both. Russet potatoes are
purchased as a fresh product and generally baked or fried before eating. Consumers might
reasonably see the potential concentration of genetic modification as being higher in potatoes
than in processed com chips. Consumers might see both human health and environmental risks
from eating Russet potatoes.
The Random nth-price Auction
Valuationexperiments use an auctionmechanism to induce people to reveal their
preferences for new goods and services (e.g., see Shogrenet al. 1994,Fox et al 1998^ and
Shogren et aL2000). In particular, Vickery's (1961) sealed bid, second-price auction has been a
popular mechanism. Thepopularity of thesecond-price auction mechanism is largely due to it
being demand revealing in theory, being relatively simple to explain, and having an endogenous
market-clearing price. Also, evidence from induced value experiments suggests the auction
mechanism can produce efficient outcomes in the aggregate (Kagel 1995). A problem with the
second-price auction, however, is that itdoes not always engage the bidders who anticipate being
off the margin, i.e., bidders whose value for agood is far below or above the market-clearing
price. These bidders have a low opportunity cost from an insincere bid, making itdifficult to
measure accurately the entire demand curve for a real-worid good like GM-food (see Miller and
Plott, 1985; Franciosi et al. 1993). Insincere bidding can besustained if the behavior is
undetected and unpunished by the institutional structure of the auction mechanism (see Cherry et
al. 2001).
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We chose the random «th-price auction for our GM-food experiments because it is
designed to engage both the on- and off-the-margin bidders (see Shogren et al. 2001). The
auction combines elements of two classic demand-revealing mechanisms: the Vickrey auction
and the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (1964) randompricing mechanism. The key characteristic of
the random nth price auction is a random but endogenously determined moiket-cleanng price.
Randomness is used to give all participants a positive probability of being a purchaser of the
auctioned good; the endogenous price guarantees that the market-clearing price is related to the
bidders' private values.
The random nth-price works as follows. Each of k bidders submits a bid for one unit of a
good; then each of the bids is rank-ordered from highest to lowest. The auction monitor then
selects a random number—the n in the mh-price auction, which is drawn from a uniform
distribution between2 and k, and the auctionmonitor sells one unit of the good to each of the n-1
highest bidders at the nth-price. Forinstance, if the monitor randomly selects n =4, the three
highest bidders each purchase one unit of the good priced at the fourth-highest bid. Ex ante,
bidders who have low or moderate valuations now have anontrivial chance to buy the good
because the price is determined randomly. This auction increases the probability that insincere
bidding will be costly (Shogren et al. 2001).
The Experimental Units
Auctions were planned and conducted at two Midwestern U.S. cities, Des Moines, lA,
and St, Paul, MN. Participants in the auctions were consumers that the Iowa State University
Statistics Laboratory contacted and obtained agreement to participate. The Statistics Laboratory
obtained 1,200 to 1,500 randomly selected residence telephone numbers from each ofthe
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metropolitan areas. These numbers were called by an employee of the ISU Statistics Laboratory
to make sure that it was in fact a residence, and then asked to speak to an adult in the household
(person who was 18 years ofage orolder).^ They were told that Iowa State University was
looking for people who were willing to participate in a group session in Des Moines (St. Paul)
that related to how people select food and household products. The sessionswere held on
Saturday, April 7'^ (April 21®'), 2001, and people were informed that the sessions would last
about 90 minutes. They were also told that at the end of the session each participant would
receive $40 in cash for their time. The sessions were held at the IowaStateUniversity Learning
Connection, 7^ and Locust Street, Des Moines (and lower level of the Classroom Office
Building, University of Minnesota, St. Paul). Three different times were available each auction
day, 9 am, 11:30 am, and 2 pm, and willing participantswere asked to choose a time that best fit
their schedule. Participation perhousehold was limited to two adult individuals, and they were
assigned to different groups.'^ To willing participants, the Statistics Laboratory followed up by
sending a lettercontaining more information, including a map andinstructions onwhen and
where the meeting would beheld, directions for getting there, and a telephone number tocontact
for more information.
There were twelve experimental units, six inDes Moines, and six inMinneapolis.
People who were called had the option ofparticipating atone ofthree experimental auction
starting times: 9 am, 11:30 am, and 2 pm. Twelve hundred people inDes Moines were called
and 99 ofthem agreed to participate. Of those who agreed to participate, 78 actually did. For
the Minneapolis experiments, 1,500 people were" called and 118 people agreed to participate. Of
those who agreed, 96 actually did. Our total sample size of participants is 174.
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Steps in the Experiment
Figure 1shows the ten specific steps ineach experimental unit.^ Instep 1when
participants arrived at the experiment, they signed a consent form agreeing to participate in the
auction. After they signed this form, they were given $40 for participating and an ID number to
preserve the participants' anonymity. The participants then read brief instructions and filled out
r
a questionnaire.
In step 2, participants were given detailed instructions about how the random nth-price
auction works, including an example written on the blackboard. After the participants learned
about the auction, a short quiz was given to participants to ensure that eve^one understood how
the auction worked. All experimental instructions are available from the authors on request.
• Step 3 was the first practice round of bidding, in which participants bid on a brand-name
candy bar. The participants were all asked to examine the product, and then place a bid on the
candy bar. The bids were collected and the first round of practice bidding was over. Throughout
the auctions, when the participants were bidding on items in a round, theyhad no indication of
what other items they may be biddingon in future rounds.
Step 4 was the second practice round ofbidding, and in this round the participants bid
separately on three different items. The products were the same brand-name candy bar, a deck
ofplaying cards, and a box ofpens. Participants knew that only one ofthe two rounds would be
chosen atrandom to bebinding, which prevented anyone from taking home more than one unit
ofany product. Following Melton etal. (1996), this random binding round eliminates the threat
ofa person reducing his bids due tohim potentially buying more than one unit:^ The consumers
first examined the three products and then submitted their bids.
After the two practice auction rounds were completed, the binding round and the binding
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nth^prices were revealed in step 5. All bid prices were written on the blackboard, and the «th-
price was circled for each of the three products. Participants could see immediately what items
they won, and the price they would pay. The participants were told that the exchange of money
for goods was in another room nearby, and would take place after the entire experiment was
completed.
In step 6, participants received one of six potential info-packets that provided non-food-
label information about biotechnology. These info-packets were produced as follows. We
created three information sources: (1) the industry perspective—a collection of statements and
. information on genetic modification provided by a group of leading biotechnology companies,
includingMonsanto and Syngenta; (2) the environmental groupperspective—a collectionof
statements and informationon geneticmodification fromGreenpeace, a leading environmental
group; and (3) the independent, thirdpartyperspective—a statement ongenetic modification
approved by a thirdpartygroup, consisting of a variety of people knowledgeable about
genetically modified goods, including scientists, professionals, religious leaders, andacademics,
who donothavea financial stake in genetically modified foods. We limited each information
source to one full page, organized into five categories: general information, scientific impact,
human impact, financial impact, and environmental impact. Figures 2-4 show the exact format
and wording of the three information sources.
These information sources were then randomized to create the six info-packets: (1) pro-
biotechnology, (2) anti-biotechnology, (3) both pro and anti-biotechnology,^ (4) pro-
biotechnology and independent, verifiable,^ (5) anti-biotechnology and independent, verifiable,
and (6) pro-biotechnology, anti-biotechnology, and independent verifiable. These info-packets
were then randomized among all twelve experimental units, with each info-packet going to two
14
experimental units.
Once the appropriate info-packet was distributed to the participants in a given unit, two
auction rounds were then conducted. The rounds were differentiated by the food label—either
the food had 2l standardfood label or a GM-label^ as shown in Figure 5. In one round (which
could beround 1or2 depending on experimental unit),^participants were bidding on the three
food products each with the standard food label. We made these labels as plain as possible to
avoid any influence on the bids from the label design. In the other round, participants were
bidding on the same three food products with a GM-label, which differed from the standard label
by the inclusionof only one extra sentence: "This product is made using genetic modification
(GM)." We constructed the GM-labels to comply with the U.S.Food and Drug Administration
regulations of GM-food labels. For each experimental unit, participants knew that only one
round would be chosen as the binding round that determined auction winners.
In step 7, participants bid on three different foodproducts: a bag of potatoes, a bottle of
vegetable oil, and a bag of tortilla chips, either with the standard orGM-label. The participants
were instructed to examine the three products, and then to write down their sealed bid for each of
the three goods. Participants bid on each good separately. The monitor then collected the bids
from the people, and then told them they were next going to look at another group of food items.
Step 8had participants examine the same three food products, each with a different label
from round 1. Again the participants examined the products, and bid on the three products
separately. The bids were then collected from all of the individuals.
Step 9selected the binding round, and the binding random «th-prices for the three goods.
Winners were notified. Each participant was asked to complete abrief post-auction
questionnaire. In step 10, the monitors dismissed the participants who did not win. The
15
monitors and the winners then exchanged money for goods, and then they were dismissed.
Data and Results
Table 1 summarizes the demographic background of the 172 participants who had
complete information. Sixty-two percent of the participants were female and the mean age of
our participants was 49.5 years. Two-thirds of the participants were married, and on average, the
participants were well educated, with the mean schooling being greater than two years of
college. The participants had a mean total household income level (before taxes) of $57,000.
Most of the participants in the experiments werewhite (ninetypercent), and most participants
indicated that they readlabels before they buy a new food product. Thedemographic
characteristics of our participants match well theattributes of the sampled areas.
Table 2 shows themean bids for each of the three products, the5-pound bag ofpotatoes,
the 32-ounce bottle ofvegetable oil, and the 1-pound bag oftortilla chips. Table 2,Part A,
shows the mean bids for all participants. For each ofthe three food products, participants were
willing to pay less when the product had theGM-label thanwhen it had the standard food label.
Table 2, Part B, shows the bids for the subset ofauction participants who bid on food products
having GM-food labels in round 1, and Part Cshows the bids for participants who bid on food
products having the GM-labels in round 2, The bids for the GM-Iabeled and standard label food
are much closer when participants bid first on GM food (round 1) compared to those who bid on
GM-labeled food second (round 2). One explanation for this result is that when participants bid
on food with GM-food labels in round 1, they imagine the products in round 2are also
genetically modified and bid accordingly. In contrast, participants who bid on plain-labeled
foods in round 1had less reason to suspect that these products were GM; they then lowered their
bids once the GM-labeled food was auctioned in round2.
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We tested our three specific hypotheses using a regression model. Recall: Holding
consumer tastes constant, (HI) GM-labels have no effect on consumers' willingness to pay for
food items, (H2) no difference exists in consumers' willingness to pay for food items due to the
GM-food-label treatment sequence, and (H3) the effects of GM-food labels on willingness to pay
for food items are identical for male and female consumers.
With our experimental unit design, the modeling is straightforward. The dependent
variable is the difference in bid prices for a commodity without and with GM-food labels, in
which the individual bid price is designated as "non-labeled" and "labeled:"
ftnon-labeled onon-labeted , onon-labeled-v . , .non-labeled /i\
i - P\ P2 UJ
nlabeled olabeled , /Dlabeled , ..labeled « /o\
- P\ +P2 ' U;
where P,- represents the price bid for a goodbyparticipant i; is an intercept term; X/2 is a
vector of socio-demographic variables, and pi is theassociated vector of coefficients, and///is a
random error term. Equations (1) and (2) can berearranged toobtain an equation for the
difference in bid prices for a givenproduct andparticipant:
pnan-labeled _ plabeled _ onon-labeled olabeled , (onon-labeled olabeled\v , non-labeled ..labeled //is
-Pi P\ +^2 -Pl -Mi (3)
or
pnon-labeled nlabeled /y' , /y* •
n - Pl + Pi^ii'^Mi (4)
When equation (3) is fitted by least squares, and are estimates ofdifferences
between coefficients in equations (1) and (2). The dependent variable in all of the regressions is
a person's difference in bids for a food with a standard label and food with a GM-label. Note
that using the difference specification in equation (4) eliminates individual fixed effects, e.g..
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tastes. The dependent variable will contain a relatively large amount of noise, and the for the
fitted equation will be"smaller."'®
Three sets of tables of results are reported, one set for each of the three products—the
potatoes, the tortilla chips, and the vegetable oil. "Labelsl" is a dummyvariable taking a value
of 1 if an experimental unit bid on foods with GM-labels in round 1 (and standard-labeled foods
in round 2). The other two explanatory variables are household income and gender. Gender is a
dummy variable taking a value of 1 if a person is female.
Tables 3,4, and 5 report the regression results for vegetable oil, tortilla chips, and
potatoes. Regression (1) reports a test of the difference in bid prices due to GM-labels. The
intercept is positive implying that on average, participants were willing to pay 14 cents less for a
32-ounce bottle of vegetable oil labeled as geneticallymodified, 15 cents less for a 1-poundbag
of tortilla chips labeled as genetically modified, and 13cents less for a 5-pound bag of Russet
potatoes labeled as genetically modified. All three intercept terms are statistically significant at
the 1 percent level. We therefore rejecthypothesis HI: GM-labels had a significant effecton
consumers' willingness to pay for each food item.
This result differs from thatfound inLusk et al.'s (2001) GM-food experiment, in which
the majority ofauction participants, who were students atKansas State University, were
unwilling to paya premium for non-GM comchips. They did, however, find a subset of student
bidders, about 20 percent, willing to pay at least $0.25/o2 to exchange their GM-chips for non-
GM-chips. Lusk etal. recognize the uniqueness of their sample, and they conclude by
speculating that "ifexperiments were conducted with alarger, potentially more representative
sample, we would expect a larger percentage ofparticipants to bid [for non-GM food], and bid at
higher levels." Our results confirm their expectations—the average adult in amajor Midwestern
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city was willing to pay about a 14 percent premium for the food they perceived as non-GM.
In regression (2), the difference in bid prices is regressed on an intercept term and the
variable "labels1." The coefficient of this dummy variable is negative for all three products,
indicating that participants who bid on the GM-labeled food in the first round paid a smaller
premium for plain-labeledfood than the other participants! The premiumfor vegetable oil was
17 cents smaller, for tortilla chips the premium was 11 cents smaller, and for potatoes the
premium was 19 cents smaller for participants whobid on food products with GM-labels in
round one. The coefficient of the dummy variable for "labels1" was statistically significant for
two of the threeproducts." Therefore, wereject Hypothesis H2 for two foods—a significant
difference did exist in consumers' wiUingness to pay for vegetable oil and potatoes when they
first bid on foods with GM-food labels.
Regression (3) is used for testing household income effects on the bid pricedifference.
For these regressions, thecoefficient of income was positive butnot statistically significant ,(5
percentlevel). Regression (4) included gender as an explanatory variable. The coefficient of
gender is negative for all three products, indicating that women pay a smaller premium for plain-
labeled-foods. This coefficient, however, is not significantly different from zero (5 percent).
Regression (5) includes both income and gender asexplanatory variables, and neither coefficient
was significantly different from zero in these equations." Therefore, we do not reject Hypothesis
H3: GM-food labels had the same effect on willingness topay for male and female consumers.
The results from our experiments are noteworthy. People, on average, paid about a 14
percent premium topurchase food they perceived as non-GM. The premium was similar across
the three food products, suggesting that most people perceive net GM-effects similarly for the
three goods. The observation that a large premium exists for standard labels has implications
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from the industry perspective that strongly opposes GM-labeling on food.
We suggest two interpretations. First, without the GM-labels, consumers are paying an
implicit tax by bidding more for food than they otherwise would. GM-food labels would
therefore benefit consumers by informing them of GM content, which lowers their bid. An
alternative interpretation is that consumers do not understand genetic modification, and given
genetically modified food products are deemed as "substantially equivalent" to their non-GM
counterparts, consumers' would be better off by not being exposed to GM-labels. If this is the
case, more information on the risks or benefits of GM-foods could help consumers make more
informed decisions. Whatever the explanation for this might be, it is apparent that consumers'
demand for GM-foods is significantly lower than the demand for the non-GM counterpart.
Conclusion
This study has shown that consumers' willingness to pay for a food product decreases
when the food label indicates that a food product is genetically modified. Consumers were
willing topay about a 14percent premium for food items they perceived as non-GM. In
addition, gender, income, and other demographic characteristics do notappear to alter a
consumer's willingness topay for genetically modified foods. This paper has also shown that the
order inwhich consumers bidon food, i.e., whether they bidon the food withGM-labels in
round one orround two has a significant impact on the willingness topay for GM-foods.
Participants who bid on food with GM-labels in round 1had amuch higher willingness to pay
forGM-food than the participants who bidon food with GM-food labels in round2.
The implications ofthis study are notable given the on-going global controversy over the
issue of labels on genetically modified foods. This debate has forced many countries around the
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world to consider or to implement new food labeling policies. Given that the average adult
consumer in a major Midwestern city did reveal a significant premium for foods they perceive as
non-GM, a mandatory GM labeling policy seems unlikely to be in the best interest of the
biotechnology industry but may be in the interest of consumers.
Future research will examine the effects of different types of information on consumers'
willingness to pay for foods that might be genetically modified. Another avenue for future
research could examine how consumers react to GM-foods that have specific benefits. Our food
products in these auctions weremodified anddeemed substantially equivalent to the
conventional commodity. SomeGM-foods have beenmodified to enhance the quality (e.g.,
protein, fat, sugarcontent, shelf life) of theproduct. Twosuch products are flavor-saver
tomatoes thatweregenetically engineered to have a longershelflife, and "goldenrice,"which
was genetically modified to provide more vitamin A, which has potential benefits to people in
Third World countries.
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Footnotes
i
^Phil Dixon andWayne Fuller, Department ofStatistics, Iowa State University, provided
assistance with the statistical design part of the project.
^Akey distinction between experimental economics and experimental psychology is that
participants in economicsexperiments must be willingto back their stated preferences for a good
by a real economic commitment. In psychological (and sociological) experiments, participants
are usually asked to give their stated preferences.
In addition to a participant's age, the Statistics Laboratory also asked for gender.
When two adults in a household participated, the Statistics Laboratory talked separately to
them to obtain a commitment to participate, and they were told that they would be assigned to
different groups.
^The complete set ofinstructions given to participants is available from the authors.
^Ifone assumes that there is little orno income effect from the deck ofcards and box ofpens,
the two bids on the candy bar should be the same. The reason is that since the deck of cards and
box ofpens are neither complements norsubstitutes to thecandy bar, they should notimpact the
bids on the candy bar. AWilcoxon signed-rank test confirmed that the bids for the candy bars
are not significantly different in the two rounds, with a test statistic of 0.03. This result does not
contradict thenotion that thesubjects' bidding behavior was reasonable.
When a participant received both pro-biotechnology and anti-biotechnology information, the
order was randomized, so that some people got the pro-biotechnology information first, and
£ somepeople got the anti-biotechnology information first.
_ When verifiable information was distributed, monitors always distributed it after the other
information sources.
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^We randomized the sequencing ofthe standard food and GM-labels across experimental units.
One unit had the standard label in round 1, and GM-label in round 2. The second unit had the
GM-label in round 1, and the standard label in round 2.
A model of differences removes all variables that have coefficients that are the same in price
equation for plain- and GM-labeled food.
"The differences-of-difference comparisons across products is appropriate here because the
person is held constant.
Also, marital status, race, education, and age did not have coefficients that were significantly
different from zero.
Figure 1: Steps in the experiment
Step 1
Fills consent form and
questionnaire; receives
$40 and I.D. number
Step 5
Step 2
Random «th-price
auction is explained
Step 4
Auction of a candy
bar, a deck of cards,
and a box of pens
Step 3
Candy bar
auction
Step 6
Pro-biotechnology
Anti-biotechnology
Binding practice round
and binding nth prices
are revealed
Both pro and anti-
biotechnology
Pro-biotechnology and
verifiable information
Step 7
First round of bidding
on food products
Step 9
Binding food round
and binding wth prices
are revealed
Anti-biotechnology and
verifiable information
Both pro and anti-
biotechnology and
verifiable information
Step 8
Second round of bidding
on food products
Step 10
Post-auction
questionnaire; winning
people purchase goods
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Figure 2: Anti-biotechnology information
Thefollowing is a collection ofstatements and information on genetic modificationfrom
Greenpeace, a leading environmental group.
General Information
Genetic modification is one of the most dangerous things being done to your food sources
today. There are many reasons that genetically modified foods should be banned, mainly because
unknown adverse effects could be catastrophic! Inadequate safety testing ofGM plants, animals, and
food products has occurred, so humans are the ones testing whether or not GM-foods are safe.
Consumers should not have to test new food products to ensure that they are safe.
Scientific Impact
The process of genetic modification takes genes from one organism and puts them into
another. This process is very risky. The biggest potential hazard of genetically modified (GM) foods
is the unknown. This is a relatively new technique, and no one can guarantee that consumers will not
be harmed. Recently, many governments in Europe assured consumers that there would be no harm
to consumers over mad-cow disease, but unfortunately, their claims were wrong. We do not want
consumers to be harmed by GM-food.
Human Impact
Genetically modified foods couldposemajorhealth problems. The potentialexistsfor
allergens to be transferred to a GM-food product that noone would suspect. Forexample, if genes
from a peanut were transferred intoa tomato, andsomeone who is allergic to peanuts eats this new
tomato, they could display a peanut allergy.
Another problem with genetically modified foods isamoral issue. These foods are taking
genes from one living organism and transplanting them into another. Many people think it ismorally
wrong to mess around with life forms on such a fundamental level.
Financial Impact
GM-foods are being pushed onto consumers by big businesses, which care only about their
own profits and ignore possible negative side effects. These groups are actually patenting different
lifeforms that theygenetically modify, with plans to sell them in thefuture. Studies have also shown
that GM crops may get lower yields than conventional crops.
Environmental Impact
Genetically modified foods could pose major environmental hazards. Sparse testing ofGM
plants for environmental impacts has occurred. One potential hazard could be the impact ofGM
crops onwildlife. One study showed that one type ofGM plant killed Monarch butterflies.
Another potential environmental hazard could come from pests that begin to resist GM plants
that were engineered to reduce chemical pesticide application. The harmful insects and other pests
that get exposed to these crops could quickly develop tolerance and wipe out many of the potential
advantages ofGM pest resistance.
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Figure 3: Pro-biotechnology information
Thefollowing is collection ofstatements and information on genetic modification
provided by a group ofleading biotechnologycompanies, includingMonsanto and Syngenta.
General Information
Genetically modified plants and animals have the potential to be one of the greatest
discoveriesin the history of farming. Improvements in crops so far relate to improved insect and
disease resistance and weed control. These improvements using bioengineering/GM technology lead
to reduced cost of food production. Future GM-food products may have health benefits.
Scientific Impact
Genetic modification is a technique that has been used to produce food products that are
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Genetic engineering has brought new
opportunities to fanners for pest control and in the future will provide consumers with nutrient
enhanced foods. GM plants and animals have the potential to be the single greatest discovery in
the history of agriculture. Wehavejust seen the tipof the iceberg of futurepotential.
Human Impact
The health benefits from genetic modification can be enormous. A special type of rice called
"golden rice" has akeady been created whichhas higher levels of vitamin A. This could be very
helpful because the disease VitaminA Deficiency(VAD) is devastating in Third World countries.
VAD causes irreversible blindness in over 500,000 children and is also responsible for over one
million deaths annually. Sincerice is the staple food in thediets of millions of people in theThird
World, goldenrice has the potential of improving millions of lives a year by reducing the casesof
VAD.
The FDA has approved GM-food for humanconsumption, and Americans have been
consuming GM-foods for years. Whileevery food product maypose risks, there has neverbeena
documented case ofa person getting sick from GM-food.
Financial Impact
Genetically modified plants have reduced thecostof food production, which means
lower food prices, and that can help feed the world. In America, lower food prices help decrease
the number ofhungry people and also letconsumers save a little more money onfood.
Worldwide the number ofhungry people has been declining, but increased crop production using
GM technology canalsohelp further reduce world hunger.
Environmental Impact
GM technology has produced new methods of insect control that reduce chemical
insecticide application by 50 percent or more. This means less environmental damage. GM
weed control isproviding new methods to control weeds, which are a special problem in no-till
farming. Genetic modification of plants has the potential to be one of the most environmentally
helpful discoveries ever.
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Figure 4: Independent, verifiable information
Thefollowing is a statement on genetic modification approved by a thirdparty group,
consisting ofa variety ofindividuals knowledgeable about genetically modifiedfoods, including
scientists, professionals, religious leaders, and academics. These parties have no financial stake
in genetically modifiedfoods.
General Information
Bipengineering is a type of genetic modification where genes are transferred across
plants or animals, a process that would not otherwise occur. (In common usage, genetic
modification means bioengineering.) With bioengineered pest resistance in plants, the process is
somewhat similar to the process of how a flu shot works in the human body. Flu shots work by
injecting a virus into the body to helpmake a human bodymore resistant to the flu.
Bioengineered plant-pest resistance causes a plant to enhance its own pest resistance.
Scientific Impact
The Food and Drug Administration standards for GM-food products (chips, cereals,
potatoes, etc.) are based on the principle that they have essentially the same ingredients, although
they have been modified slightly from the original plant materials.
Oils made from bioengineered oil crops have been refined, and this process removed
essentially all the GM proteins, making them like non-GM oils. So even if GM crops were •
deemed to be harmful for human consumption, it is doubtful that vegetable oils would cause
harm.
Human Imvact
While many genetically modified foods are in the process ofbeing putonyour grocers'
shelf, there are currently no foods available in the U.S. where genetic modification has increased
nutrient content.
. AH foods present a small risk ofan allergic reaction tosome people. No FDA approved
GM-food poses any known unique human health risks.
Financial Impact
Genetically modified seeds and other organisms are produced by businesses that seek
profits. For farmers to switch to GM crops, they must see benefits from the switch. However,
genetic modification technology may lead to changes in the organization ofthe agri-business
industry and farming. The introduction of GM-foods has the potential to decrease the prices to
consumers for groceries.
Environmental Impact
The effects ofgenetic modification on the environment are largely unknown.
Bioengineered insect resistance has reduced farmers' applications ofenvironmentally hazardous
insecticides. More studies are occurring to help assess the impact of bioengineered plants and
organisms onthe environment. Acouple ofstudies reported harm toMonarch butterflies from
GM crops, but other scientists were not able to recreate the results. The possibility of insects
growing resistant to GM crops is a legitimate concern.
Figure 5: GM- and standard labels used for the three food items
Russet Potatoes
Net weight 5 lb.
This product is made using
genetic modification (GM).
Tortilla Chips
Net weight 16 oz.
Fresh made ThursdayApril 5'^
This product is made using
genetic modification (GM).
Vegetable Oil
Net weight 32 fl. oz.
This product is made using
genetically modified (GM) soybeans.
Russet Potatoes
Net weight 5 lb.
Tortilla Chips
Net weight 16 OZ- '
Fresh made ThursdayApril 5^^
Vegetable Oil
Net weight 32 fl. oz.
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Table 1. Characteristics of the auction participants
Variable Definition Mean St. Dev
Gender 1 if female 0.62 0.49
Age The participant's age 49.5 17.5
Marital 1 if the individual is married 0.67 0.47
Status
Education Years of schooling 14.54 2,25
Household Number of people in participant's household 2.78 1.65
Income The households income level (in thousands) 57.0 32.6
Race 1 if participant is white 0.90 0.30
Labels 1 if never read labels before a new food purchase 0.01 0.11
1 if rarely read labels before a new food purchase 0.11 0.31
1 if sometimes read labels before a new food purchase 0.31 0.46
1 if oftenread labels before a newfood purchase 0.37 0.48
1if always read labels before a new food purchase 0.20 0.40
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Table 2. Mean bids
A. Mean bids - all participants
Observations mean bid std dev Minimum Maximum
GM OIL 172 0.91 0.84 0 3.99
OIL 172 1.05 0.85 0 3.79
GM CHIPS 172 0.93 0.86 0 3.99
CHIPS 172 1.08 0.85 0 4.99
GM POTATOES 172 0.78 0.67 0 3
POTATOES 172 0.91 0.67 0 3.89
B. Mean bids when participants bid on food with GM-food labels in round 1
Observations mean bid std dev Minimum Maximum
GMOIL 88 0.98 0.91 0 3.99
OIL 88 1.04 0.89 0 3.79
GM CHIPS 88 0.95 0.87 0 3.25
CHIPS 88 1.05 0.81 0 2.99
GM POTATOES 88 0.90 0.69 0 2.5
POTATOES 88 0.94 0.63 0 2.51
C. Mean bids when participants bid on food with GM-food labels in round 2
Observations mean bid std dev Minimum Maximum
GM OIL 84 0.83 0.77 0 3.25
OIL 84 1.06 0.80 0 3
GM CHIPS 84 0.90 0.86 0 3.99
CHIPS 84 1.11 0.89 0 4.99
1 GM POTATOES 84 0.65 0.63 0 3
POTATOES 84 0.88 0.72 0 3.89
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Table 3. Vegetable Oil: OLS estimates of models explaining difference in bid prices
for GM-labeled and standard-labeled vegetable oil (n=172)
Dependent variable: Bid price non-labeled food - bid price GM-labeled food '
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)Regressors
Intercept 0.143 **
(0.043)
0.231 **
(0.061)
0.028
(0.087)
0.207 **
(0.070)
0.093
(0.106)
Labels 1 -.173 *
(0.085)
Income 0.0020
(0.0013)
0.0019
(0.0013)
Gender -0.104
(0.089)
-0.0947
(0.089)
N.A. .024 .014 .008 .020
'Estimate ofcoefficients with standard errors inparentheses
** indicates that a variable is significant at 1%
* indicates that a variable is significant at 5%
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Table 4. Tortilla Chips: OLS estimates of models explaining difference in bid prices
for GM-labeled and standard-labeled tortilla chips (n=172)
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 0.152**
(0.037)
0.206 **
(0.053)
0.088
(0.075)
0.173 **
(0.061)
0.108
(0.092)
Labels 1 -0.106
(0.075)
Income 0.0011
(0.0012)
0.0011
(0.0012)
Gender -0.034
(0.077)
-0.0285
(0.0775)
N.A. .012 .006 .001 .006
'Estimate ofcoefficients with standard errors inparentheses
** indicates that a variable is significant at 1%
* indicates that a variable is significant at 5%
Table 5. Potatoes: OLS estimates ofmodels explaining difference in bid prices for
GM-labeled and standard-labeled potatoes (n=172)
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Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) • (5)
Intercept 0.132**
(0.032)
0.229 **
(0.045)
0.09
• (0.065)
0.139 **
(0.053)
0.094
(0.080)
Labels1 -0.189 **
(0:630)
Income 0.0007
(0.0010)
0.0007
(0.0010)
Gender -0.0103
(0.0666)
-0.0067
(0.0668)
N.A. .050 .003 .000 .003
'Estimate ofcoefficients with standard errors in parentheses
** Indicates that a variable is significant at 1%
* indicates that a variable is significant at 5%
